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NOTES
AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO OBSCENITY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE
RYAN J. ADAMS†
INTRODUCTION
Philosopher Bertrand Russell once quipped, “Obscenity is
whatever happens to shock some elderly and ignorant
magistrate.”1
Although Russell was an Englishman,2 he
highlights a problem that has plagued American obscenity
doctrine for decades: subjectivity in definition.3 The current
standard for obscenity, as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. California,4 has been the subject of criticism for years,
but is now, according to some critics, an anachronism.5 The
Miller test for obscenity looks to three factors:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work

†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.A., 2008, Loyola College. I would like to thank my parents,
colleagues, and all the wonderful professors who have taught me over the years.
1
Thoughts on the Business Life, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 328.
2
RAY MONK, BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE, 1872-1921, at 4
(1996).
3
See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he intractable obscenity
problem.”). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (“[N]o majority of the Court
has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what
constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’
police power.”).
4
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5
See Dennis W. Chiu, Comment, Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community
Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185, 204, 215 (1995) (noting that “[w]hen Miller was decided in
1974, the nation had yet to widely use much of the modern telecommunications
equipment we have today” and arguing that “[t]he existence of local community
standards has either become extinct or is about to enter extinction because of
society’s growing interconnectedness”).
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depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.6

While criticisms of Miller are legion, this Note devotes itself
to the peculiarities of the first prong. As interpreted, the first
prong of this test means a “local community standard,” rather
than a larger, national standard. Indeed, the Miller opinion
declared that a “national” standard would be “unascertainable.”7
The prevalence of Internet pornography and its technical nature,
however, have created a landscape vastly different from the
pornography of Miller. When Miller was decided, in 1973,
pornography was distributed mostly by mail-order or brick and
mortar shops. Today, the overwhelming majority of pornography
is distributed through a medium that was far from the
contemplation of the justices in Miller: the Internet. The
widespread adoption of the Internet as the primary means for
transmitting pornography has changed not only the business of
pornography, but how it is viewed in society.
Over the past decade, hardcore pornography has enjoyed an
unprecedented degree of cross-over mainstream success. Adult
film stars now feature in mainstream television and movies,8 and
explicit pornographic DVDs and magazines are available at
convenience stores nationwide. This may be due to the sheer
volume of pornography on the Internet, and the ease of
accessibility.
Simply put, pornography is more prevalent,
accessible, and popular than ever.9 Now that Internet networks
6

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 31.
8
For instance, adult film star Sasha Grey recently appeared in Academy Award
winning Director Steven Soderbergh’s The Girlfriend Experience. See THE
GIRLFRIEND EXPERIENCE (Magnolia Pictures 2009); see also DAVID FOSTER
WALLACE, Big Red Son, in CONSIDER THE LOBSTER 3 (2006).
9
See Press Release, Optenet, More Than One Third of Web Pages Are
Pornographic (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.optenet.com/enus/new.asp?id=270 (indicating that more than a third of websites on the internet are
pornographic); Statistics on Pornography, Sexual Addiction, and Online
Perpetrators, SAFE FAMILIES, http://www.safefamilies.org/sfStats.php (last visited
Apr. 5, 2012) (“More than 70% of men from 18 to 34 visit a pornographic site in a
typical month.”); Jason Palmer, Porn Putting on its Sunday Best, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7845561.stm (last updated Jan. 23, 2009)
(analyzing relationship between social networking websites and pornography
websites); One in 10 Men Surf the Internet for Porn - and 40% of Those Peek at Saucy
Pictures While Their Partner is in the Next Room, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:54
7
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increasingly use high speed broadband connections, streaming
video technology has grown, and hours of sexually explicit
material are available to millions of people within seconds.10
The shift to Internet-based distribution models makes the
criteria under which obscenity is measured, Miller’s local
“contemporary community standards,”11 unworkable, nonprobative, and anachronistic. It is impossible to ascertain a
“local community” for material on the Internet, a global network.
This issue has been taken up not only by numerous
commentators,12 but by courts as well.13 In particular, many
have argued for a standard that takes into account the
“community” of the Internet, or a uniform “national” standard.14
But Internet community standards pose problems as well
because the community of the Internet is geographically
boundless. It comprises a truly global network. The Miller “local

AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1328369/1-10-men-surf-internet-porn40-partner-room.html (noting that 1 in 10 men surf the internet for pornography,
and noting that 8 percent of surveyed males responded that they use the Internet
primarily to view pornography); Dan Ackman, How Big is Porn ?, FORBES (May 25,
2001, 1:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2001/05/25/0524porn.html (analyzing
different valuations of the pornography industry, all in multiple billions of dollars).
10
And it is often free to the dismay of traditional publishers and brick and
mortar stores. Studies indicate that at least five of the top one hundred websites in
America are “portals for free pornography.” Sites like these attract more users than
TMZ and Huffington Post, and even overshadow traditional mainstays of the illegal
downloading community. See Ben Fritz, Tough Times in the Porn Industry, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at B1 (describing the prevalence of free, online streaming
pornography sites). These sites make most of their revenue in advertising and
traffic, and have affected the overall pornography industry. See id. Old school
powerhouses such as Vivid Entertainment report revenues down by at least 20%, a
figure that correlates directly to attendance at trade show events. Id.; see also
WALLACE, supra note 8.
11
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
12
See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 5, at 188.
13
See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 162–63 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009).
14
See Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250–56; see also Anne Wells Branscomb,
Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in
Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1656, 1672 (1995) (noting that a virtual
community standard could be a solution to the obscenity problem); William D.
Deane, Comment, COPA and Community Standards on the Internet: Should the
People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity Standard in Las Vegas and
New York?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 292, 294–95 (2001) (arguing for a “virtual
community standard”); Patrick T. Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards:
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of
Cyberspace?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 150–51 (1996) (arguing for the adoption of
a “virtual community standard”).

WF_Adams (Do Not Delete)

214

12/3/2012 12:36 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:211

community standards” test has become problematic for at least
three reasons.
First, the current test encourages forum
shopping.15 Second, the test is too subjective.16 How is one to
determine what these relevant standards are? What size is the
community one looks to? Third, and directly related to the
problem of the most restrictive community, Miller has the
potential to chill free speech.17 Pornography is only illegal when
it has been defined as such, making obscenity little more than a
legal conclusion. A pornographer in California has no way of
knowing whether her conduct is criminally obscene to someone in
Florida, and therefore is likely to not assert her rights at all.
This is unfair because she is limited by the unknown—she cannot
know the bounds of her legal rights. Moreover, she has done
nothing to force her material upon Floridians, but is being
pursued by over-vigilant prosecutors.18
As a result of these problems, courts are now reconsidering
Miller. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Kilbride,19 recently held that a “national community standards”
test should apply to Internet pornography.20 The Ninth Circuit’s
adoption of a “national community standards” test is a step in the
right direction. It alleviates the problems of forum shopping and
chilled speech, and acknowledges the Internet as a medium
which transcends local borders.21 While the Ninth Circuit
approach should be lauded for recognizing that Miller is
unworkable in the modern age, its “national standards” test
poses many of the same problems of Miller. For example, the

15

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
17
See infra Part II.D.
18
Debra D. Burke, Thinking Outside the Box: Child Pornography, Obscenity and
the Constitution, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 37 (2003) (“[I]t is difficult for the sender to
appreciate the standards for patent offensiveness of a distant community, or even to
block access to would-be recipients in less tolerant communities.”).
19
584 F.3d 1240.
20
Id. at 1254 (“[A] national community standard must be applied in regulating
obscene speech on the Internet . . . .”).
21
While this recognition of the problem of Miller vis-à-vis the Internet may
mark a new approach to obscenity jurisprudence, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals declined to follow this interpretation shortly after in United States v. Little,
365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We decline to follow the reasoning of
Kilbride in this Circuit. . . . [T]he Miller contemporary community standard remains
the standard by which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the
Internet and elsewhere.”).
16
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“national standards” test suffers from vagueness and
subjectivity. Because the national standard fails to address the
concern of subjectivity, it ultimately fails.
This Note proposes a new approach that borrows from the
Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test. While
not a complete departure in methodology from the Miller test, the
language of “evolving standards of decency” would lend
objectivity in a legal analysis of obscenity.
The Eighth
Amendment approach, which is similar in language and meaning
to “contemporary community standards,” looks to objective
indications for evidence of contemporary societal values.22
Because the Internet is a protean medium, and the punishment
of obscenity is rooted in criminal law, this approach can lend
necessary guidance to an obscenity analysis. Moreover, “evolving
standards of decency” has been used explicitly to determine a
national consensus.23 It is not only applicable to the Eighth
Amendment, but has been employed in recent decisions in the
context of sexual privacy, as well.24
Using an Eighth Amendment framework also opens the
analysis to international law,25 which is compelling, considering
the Internet is a global medium.
Although international
comparisons have been criticized by scholars and the bench, most
of these criticisms are aimed at the lack of guiding criteria in
international analysis.26 Implementing an objective methodology
in determining which countries to compare can reduce
22
The Eighth Amendment offers protection against “cruel and unusual
punishment[].” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has analyzed whether
punishment exceeds the Eighth Amendment by looking to “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958). The standards of society are to be determined by looking to “objective
factors to the maximum possible extent.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000
(1991) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).
23
See infra Part IV.B.
24
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 564 (2003). Further, there may be
an argument in the fact that Lawrence essentially holds that morality is never a
legitimate government interest. This would argue for allowing obscene material to
be protected by the First Amendment, a position that this author leaves for others,
and does not think the Supreme Court will support anytime soon.
25
See infra Part IV.D.
26
See David M. O’Brien, More Smoke than Fire: The Rehnquist Court’s Use of
Comparative Judicial Opinions and Law in the Construction of Constitutional
Rights, 22 J.L. & POL. 83, 93 (2006) (“Another standard that has invited the use of
foreign legal sources . . . is that of the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of [our] maturing society’ when interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ vis-à-vis the death penalty.”).
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subjectivism. In particular, this Note proposes using Professor
Geert Hofstede’s seminal study on multinational cultural values,
Culture’s
Consequences:
Comparing
Values,
Behaviors,
Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations,27 (“Hofstede
Study”) to identify countries with similar moral values to
America, making them relevant for comparison. The varying
indices Hofstede employs create a substantially diverse cross
section of values, normalizing the analysis. Using the Hofstede
Study to identify countries that are similar to America in a
variety of cultural indices can provide a varied, yet methodical,
guideline for selecting countries against which to compare
American law. This, in effect, creates a guided “international
community” for analysis, while avoiding extreme outliers.28
This Note argues for an objective approach to international
comparative law using the Hofstede Study as a guideline. Part I
charts the modern history of obscenity jurisprudence, starting
with Miller and going up to the current circuit split. Part II
analyzes the problems of Miller and its progeny. Part III briefly
considers the problems of the Ninth Circuit’s “national
community” approach, applying arguments from Part II. Finally,
Part IV identifies a methodology derived from the Eighth
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test which uses
objective criteria to guide the development of a national standard
which is informed by international law.
I.

“I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT. . . .” A BRIEF HISTORY OF
OBSCENITY LAW IN AMERICA

First Amendment freedoms are among the most prized
rights of United States citizens. The First Amendment provides
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”29 This right is incorporated to the
individual States by the Fourteenth Amendment and judicial
interpretation. Despite the relatively straightforward language
of the Amendment, the Supreme Court has carved out different
categories of “speech,” some protected by the Amendment, and
27
See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed.
2001).
28
Some attempts have been made to define a relevant “virtual” or “Internet”
community. This Note does not attempt this.
29
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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others not.30 Among the unprotected categories of speech are the
“lewd and obscene.”31 While this categorical approach sounds
simple enough, defining what is “obscene” has proven to be an
arduous, if not Sisyphean, task.32
This section analyzes this history and problems of defining
“obscenity” in American jurisprudence. Part I.A notes the lead
up to Miller v. California, and then examines that case and the
introduction of the modern obscenity test. Part I.B highlights
how the first prong of the Miller test has been interpreted,
specifically noting that it does not utilize a “national” standard.
Part I.C briefly explores how Miller has been used in the Internet
age. Part I.D analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s eschewal of Miller as
applied to the Internet in United States v. Kilbride, and explores
the court’s analysis in doing so. Part I.E further explores the
court’s analysis in Kilbride, specifically looking at the Ninth
Circuit’s use of Supreme Court precedent in its decision.
A.

Miller v. California

In the 1964 Supreme Court case Jacobellis v. Ohio,33 Justice
Stewart declared that defining obscenity was something that he
could “never succeed in intelligibly doing.”34 In the same case,
Stewart devised a decidedly non-scientific test to identify hardcore pornography: “I know it when I see it.”35
In the hopes of elaborating upon this imprecise standard, the
Court re-examined the standard for obscenity in the case of
Miller v. California.36 The defendant in Miller was convicted by a
jury for violating section 311.2(a) of the California Penal Code37
for “knowingly distributing obscene matter.”38 The defendant
30

See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (holding
certain classes of speech as unprotected).
31
Id. at 572.
32
See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 163 (11th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009).
33
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
34
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35
Id.
36
See 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (referring to “the intractable . . . problem” (quoting
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
37
See id. at 18 (noting that the relevant statute provided that “ ‘[o]bscene’
means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest”).
38
Id. at 16.
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had a business of mass mailing advertisements for adult books,39
and found himself arrested, charged with distribution of obscene
material, and convicted of a misdemeanor, when an elderly
woman received graphic and unsolicited brochures.40
Acknowledging flaws in the Court’s obscenity doctrine, and
perhaps alluding to Justice Stewart’s test, the Miller Court
aimed to “formulate standards more concrete than those in the
past.”41 The Court stated that “no majority of the Court has at
any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine
what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to
regulation.”42 It could agree only that this area of law was in
flux.43
Needing a workable standard, the Court devised the current
test to determine whether a work was obscene. The Court
decided that juries must look to:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.44

B.

Contemporary Community Standards Are Not Judged by a
National Community

Having set forth a test for obscenity, the Court then had to
clarify it. Turning to the “contemporary community standards”
prong of its test, the Court concluded that a national standard
could not apply to obscenity law.45 The Court cited diversity of
nationhood and state government as a primary reason for not
articulating a national standard.46 Moreover, the Court feared

39

The Court referred to this as “euphemistically called ‘adult’ material.” Id.
See id. at 16–18 (“[A] situation in which sexually explicit materials have been
thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way
indicated any desire to receive such materials.”).
41
Id. at 20.
42
Id. at 22.
43
See id. at 23 (“This is an area in which there are few eternal verities.”).
44
Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (per curiam)).
45
See id. at 30 (“[T]his does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed,
uniform national standards . . . .”).
46
See id.
40
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that a national standard would be overly abstract.47 This
sentiment was not new; Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v.
Ohio argued that a national standard would not be provable.48
Drawing further on history, the Court looked to the tradition of
allowing jurors to “draw on the standards of their community” for
evidence of standards.49 The Court ultimately held that “[i]t is
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City.”50
C.

Community Standards into the Information Age

As applied, the Miller test has come to mean the standards
of regional communities, which can be rather provincial.51
Subsequently, courts have uniformly held that obscenity should
be judged by the standards of a local county.52 In the modern era,
however, many have argued against the application of Miller to
Internet pornography, urging for a broader standard.53
Courts have been loath to adopt a broader standard. An oftcited example of the current standard for Internet pornography is
seen in the influential decision of United States v. Thomas.54 In
Thomas, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
the geographic intangibility of the Internet necessitated a
national standard for the first prong of the Miller test.55 In what
could have been a step forward in recognizing the unique
47
See id. (“[I]t would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some
abstract formulation.”).
48
378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe that there is no
provable ‘national standard’ . . . . At all events, this Court has not been able to
enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.”).
49
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. Although this raises separate questions of
introducing evidence and expert testimony.
50
Id. at 32.
51
Matthew Towns, Note, The Community Standards of Utah and the Amish
Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 MO. L. REV. 735, 735 (2003) (describing
communities as “usually smaller than a single state”).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., Schedule No.
2102, 709 F.2d 132, 135–37 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying New York City’s standard).
53
See, e.g., Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as
an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 25–
27 (2004). But see Burke, supra note 18 (“[T]he application of the least tolerant
community standards is the safest route . . . .”).
54
74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996).
55
Id.

WF_Adams (Do Not Delete)

220

12/3/2012 12:36 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:211

characteristics of the Internet, the court failed and held that the
standard of a local Tennessee community should apply.56 The
court refused to address defendants’ claim that the unique
attributes of the Internet required a new definition of
“community.”57 This view has been consistently upheld since.58
D. Toward a New Standard: The Ninth Circuit Adopts a
National Obscenity Standard in United States v. Kilbride
Recently, in the 2009 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case
United States v. Kilbride,59 the Ninth Circuit carved a new path
in the jurisprudence of obscenity, holding that a “national
community standards” test should apply to obscenity charges
arising from Internet pornography. The case dealt with the
prosecution of Californian defendants who were in the business
of sending unsolicited, pornographic emails.60 Defendants were
prosecuted under a federal Anti-Spam Act61 and charged with
various offenses, including obscenity.
At trial, the District Court opened the door for a national
standard, stating that “community standards is a broader
inquiry . . . [that should be made] in the light of contemporary
standards that would be applied by the average adult person in
the community.”62 While at first blush this sounds like the Miller
test, the court went on to say, “Contemporary community
standards are set by what is in fact accepted in the community as
a whole; that is to say by society at large . . . and not merely by
what the community tolerates nor by what some persons or
groups of persons may believe . . . .”63 Moreover, the court
instructed the jury that “ ‘community’ . . . is not defined by a
precise geographic area. You may consider evidence of standards
existing in places outside of this particular district.”64 Little

56

Id.
Id.
58
See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010).
59
584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009).
60
United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Kilbride
I). This fact pattern is rather similar to Miller where defendants were from
California, and were prosecuted for distributing unsolicited pornographic mail. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16–18 (1973).
61
Kilbride I, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
62
Id. at 1069.
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
Id.
57
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instruction was given on how this standard might be achieved,
nor was any mention made of the potential lack of objective
evidence of such standards. Defendants were convicted of fraud
and conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with electronic
mail, interstate transportation and sale of obscene materials, and
conspiracy to commit money laundering.65
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered this instruction. Defendants argued that the district
court erred in its jury instructions on the matter.66 Defendants
focused on the meaning of “contemporary community standards,”
and argued that error lay in the expansion to “communities
beyond their own . . . or of a global community.”67 Defendants
had two specific objections. First, they objected to the language
used by the district, “that is to say by society at large, or people
in general,” as an improper expansion of Miller.68 Second, they
objected to jury instructions that, “[t]he ‘community’ you should
consider in deciding these questions is not defined by a precise
geographic area,” arguing that this imprecise definition was
improper.69 According to the defendants, the district court
neither complied with the proper Miller test, nor complied with a
national definition.70 The court instead created a vague middle
ground.
The Court of Appeals found no error in either of these
instructions.71 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in
part on Hamling v. United States,72 noting, “that the relevant
community lacks a precise geographic definition follows directly
from Hamling’s holding that the relevant community is not to be
geographically defined in federal obscenity prosecutions,
permitting the jury to apply their own sense . . . based on their
own community,” to rebuke the defendants’ argument that a
clear geographic definition must be given.73 Further, the court

65

See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
67
Id. at 1247.
68
Id. at 1248 (emphasis omitted).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1247.
71
Id. at 1248 (“We conclude, applying the prevailing definition of contemporary
community standards put forth in Hamling, that the challenged portions do not
constitute prejudicial error.”).
72
418 U.S. 87, 104–05 (1974).
73
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1248 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104–05).
66
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cited Hamling as support for “the entirely logical proposition that
evidence of standards of communities outside the district may in
a court’s judgment help jurors gauge what their own sense of
contemporary community standards are.”74 The court also held
that “[t]he instruction’s references to ‘society at large’ and ‘people
in general’ are also not objectionable” to rebut defendants’
argument that an improper expansion of Miller was given.75
The Ninth Circuit based its rationale on the reasoning of
Supreme Court cases involving obscenity, community standards,
and the Internet. First, it looked to Reno v. ACLU,76 a case
where the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) as facially overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment.77 The court focused largely
though on the “fractured decision”78 in Ashcroft v. ACLU,79 a 2002
Supreme Court case.
In Ashcroft, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
Child Online Privacy Act (“COPA”), a law similar to the CDA.80
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit held that
COPA was facially overbroad because it identified material
“harmful to minors” by a contemporary community standards
test.81 This was problematic according to the Third Circuit
because “[w]eb publishers are without any means to limit access
to their sites based on the geographic location of particular
Internet users.”82 The Supreme Court vacated this judgment,
holding that COPA’s reference to “contemporary community
standards” in defining what was harmful to minors did not alone

74

Id. at 1249.
Id.
76
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
77
See id. at 877–79. The contended CDA provisions attempted to regulate
obscene content on the Internet relying on “contemporary community standards”
analogous to the Miller test. The Court, in finding the regulation overbroad, wrote,
“[T]he community standards criterion as applied to the Internet means that any
communication available to a nation wide audience will be judged by the standards
of the community most likely to be offended by the message.” Id. at 877–78 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
78
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252.
79
535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
80
See Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252 (noting that COPA was a successor to the
CDA).
81
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom.,
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
82
Id. at 175.
75
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render COPA unconstitutionally overbroad, but in plurality
addressed the issue of the “contemporary community standards”
test.83
In a concurrence, Justice O’Connor wrote that “this case still
leaves open the possibility that the use of local community
standards will cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the
Internet.”84 According to O’Connor, “given Internet speakers’
inability to control the geographic location of their audience,
expecting them to bear the burden of controlling the
recipients . . . may be entirely too much to ask . . . .”85 Moreover,
O’Connor explicitly urged that adopting a national standard
would be “necessary . . . for any reasonable regulation of Internet
obscenity.”86
Justice Breyer took a similar view in concurrence. He
agreed that the local community standard would impose the most
stringent regulations, and would “provide the most puritan of
communities with a heckler’s Internet veto affecting the rest of
the Nation.”87 He then interpreted COPA as applying a national
standard.88 The remaining Justices agreed with Kennedy, who
agreed with O’Connor and Breyer that “national variation in
community standards constitutes a particular burden on Internet
speech” but did not see the need to apply this as a new
standard.89 Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, argued that
recognition of a national standard would not solve any problems
because it would produce varied and inconsistent outcomes.90
In Kilbride, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plurality
holding in Ashcroft could be properly viewed as the “narrowest
grounds” of decision and therefore, as good law.91 Because

83

See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 580–81, 586.
Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 577–79, 584–85 (plurality
opinion) (stating that “the variance in community standards across the country
could still cause juries in different locations to reach inconsistent conclusions as to
whether a particular work is ‘harmful to minors,’ ” but not finding a problem in this
case because COPA was narrower than the CDA).
85
Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
86
Id. at 587.
87
Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring).
88
Id. at 591.
89
Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90
Id. at 607 n.3.
91
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2009) (“When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
84

WF_Adams (Do Not Delete)

224

12/3/2012 12:36 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:211

Justice O’Connor’s and Breyer’s views were narrower than
Thomas’s and Kennedy’s, the Ninth Circuit held that these
“narrower” views applied. Moreover, the court held that “the
Court has never held that a jury may in no case be instructed to
apply a national community standard in finding obscenity.”92 It
therefore ultimately held that a national standard should be
applied to Internet obscenity for the same reasons as identified in
Ashcroft.93
II. THE PROBLEM WITH MILLER
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kilbride should be lauded as
a step in the right direction, primarily because the traditional
Miller test has become anachronistic. In light of modern
obscenity prosecutions, the community standards prong of the
Miller test is problematic for three reasons: (1) it encourages
forum shopping; (2) it is vague and subjective; (3) and it is likely
to chill free speech. These problems derive from a basic truth,
that the Internet is wholly different from previous mediums in
physical structure and potential scope. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision was based upon this in part.94 This Section analyzes
these problems. Part II.A describes the intrinsic inapplicability
of the Miller test to the Internet, primarily focusing on how the
technology that comprises the Internet is different from
traditional print media, upon which Miller was founded. Part
II.B describes the potential for abuse under Miller, showing how
forum shopping is encouraged by Miller. Part II.C describes
problems with Miller itself, notably how the language of the test

taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’ ”) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
92
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254. But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973)
(“To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
‘community standard’ would be an exercise in futility.”).
93
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255 (“[O]ur holding today follows directly from a
distillation of the various opinions in Ashcroft . . . .”). Although the Ninth Circuit
was correct in identifying the need for a new approach to obscenity, most courts have
not followed suit. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159 (11th Cir. 2010).
In Little, the court explicitly declined to follow Kilbride, instead sticking to Miller.
Id. at 164.
94
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 590
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The technical difficulties associated with efforts to
confine Internet material to particular geographic areas make the problem
particularly serious.”)).
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is vague, and leads to subjective interpretation. Part II.D
describes how Miller has the potential to chill free speech,
narrowing the rights of citizens.
A.

The Internet is Fundamentally Different from Print

The technology of the Internet is remarkable in its growth
and capacity to deliver content to users, which has been quite
Streaming video
lucrative for the pornography industry.95
technology has led to a monumental expansion of pornography.96
In 2006, there were approximately 4.2 million pornographic
websites.97 This number accounted for 12% of total websites on
the Internet, and “every second, there are as many as 372 people
searching adult terms online.”98 That number is likely even
higher today.99 Annual pornography revenue is estimated at over
$13 billion.100 As pornography expands, so does its reach to
consumers and the potential for litigation. Obscenity law under
Miller is a broken system, one described as “unpopular with the
three most interested parties: anti-pornography advocates,
federal prosecutors, and pornographers.”101
Internet pornographers have little to no control over where
their material ends up.102 The Internet is made of intangible
data. It is impossible for a user on one end to anticipate where
his data will be accessed.103 Applying a local standard to test
95

See sources cited supra note 10.
See Shannon Creasy, Note, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the
Internet Age: How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller’s “Contemporary
Community Standards”, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2010) (observing that
“[t]echnological advances that allow pornographers to efficiently stream online video
and view pictures have led to an explosion in the pornography market”).
97
Id.
98
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99
See, e.g., Matt Richtel, What’s Obscene? Defendant Says Google Data Offers a
Gauge, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at A1.
100
See Creasy, supra note 96; Fritz, supra note 10 (describing Adult Video News
as worth $13 billion). But see Ackman, supra note 9 (noting that double digit billion
dollar estimations of the pornography revenue may be overinflated, suggesting that
a more approximate figure is in the low billions).
101
Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 ISJLP 317,
323 (2010).
102
See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1042 (“[S]ellers operating on the Internet often
have limited control over where their products end up. Items posted on the Internet
are immediately available for viewing and downloading by users around the world.”).
103
See id. (“[T]he Internet defies geographic boundaries, and it is still not
possible for website operators to reliably and effectively limit access based on
geographical location[s] . . . .”).
96
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whether something is “obscene” results in “individuals being
prosecuted by the standard of the most restrictive community
with access to the Internet.”104 Pornography that has yet to be
deemed “obscene” is legal,105 but may be offensive to some
potential user. Moreover, the Internet poses particular problems
to Miller.
B.

Forum Shopping

Of the most identifiable problems with Miller and the
Internet is prosecutorial forum shopping.106 The structure of the
Internet, in conjunction with the Miller test, encourages forum
shopping. Based on federal application of Miller, as seen through
cases such as United States v. Thomas,107 all one has to do to
obtain jurisdiction over pornographers is access their websites.
Prosecutors may bring suit anywhere materials are distributed.
Because of the way the Internet operates, anywhere with
Internet access is therefore a proper jurisdiction for suit.108
The facts of cases like Thomas and Little illuminate the
problems of forum shopping.
In Thomas, Californian
pornographers were prosecuted in Tennessee, although they
never took any action to place their materials in Tennessee.109 A
postal inspector “logged into defendant’s bulletin board system in
104
Id. (quoting John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, and
the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18 (2003)).
105
As long as it complies with relevant state and federal law.
106
Which can also be highly political. See Paul M. Barrett, Multiple Jeopardy?
Porn Defendants Face Indictments in Courts Far from their Bases, WALL ST. J., July
27, 1990, at A1; Jim McGee, U.S. Crusade Against Pornography Tests the Limits of
Fairness, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1993, at A1 (noting that the government’s “principal
tactic against distributors of sexually explicit films . . . [is] the use of simultaneous
or successive indictments in conservative jurisdictions around the country” with the
intention of strong-arming distributors into cessation through the burden of pending
litigation on multiple fronts); Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33
YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 324–25 (2008) (observing that, “In the United States today,
federal obscenity prosecutions are sporadic, but arbitrary and highly politicized”);
Barton Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2005, at
A21 (noting that Alberto Gonzales, Bush’s Attorney General, declared making
obscenity prosecutions a top priority).
107
74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that obscenity may be prosecuted in
any jurisdiction through which the allegedly obscene material passes).
108
See Erik G. Swenson, Comment, Redefining Community Standards in Light
of the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet: A Critique of United States v.
Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855, 880 (1998).
109
See id. at 875. This is analogous to the situation seen in Little. See infra notes
125–29 and accompanying text.
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California, scanned the information, and then selectively
downloaded pictures into Tennessee. Significantly, it was the
federal agent who purposely availed himself of the Tennessee
community, not the defendant.”110 This was not an arbitrary
decision, but one calculated to obtain conviction.111
This is but one example of what is a common practice:
“prosecutors . . . bringing
charges
only
in
conservative
communities, where they have a greater chance of empanelling a
jury that will judge sexually oriented materials obscene.”112
Professor Clay Calvert details the problem in his analysis of
“Project PostPorn,” a government operation to prosecute adult
movie producers in the late 1980s and early 1990s.113 Under the
auspices of “Project PostPorn,” Federal agents actively
prosecuted Californian pornography producers in Bible Belt
areas “in the belief that it [would] be easier to obtain convictions
in conservative, rural America than in anything-goes Los
Angeles.”114 According to a commentator, Project PostPorn was
“aimed at ruining the business of mail-order operations selling
sexually explicit—but not obscene—merchandise.”115 Moreover,
the federal government acknowledges the use of forum shopping
under “Project PostPorn.”116

110

Swenson, supra note 108, at 875.
See United States v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244, 245–46 (10th Cir. 1978)
(discussing the problem of forum shopping for conservative communities where the
defendants’ home domicile is more liberal), vacated, 439 U.S. 1061 (1979).
112
Robert F. Howe, U.S. Accused of ‘Censorship by Intimidation’ in Pornography
Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1990, at A4.
113
See Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases?
The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of
Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 56–57 (2010).
114
See id. at 57 (quoting John Johnson, Into the Valley of Sleaze: Demand is
Strong, but Police Crackdowns and a Saturated Market Spell Trouble for One of
L.A.’s Biggest Businesses, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 17, 1991, at 8, 10).
115
Calvert, supra note 113, at 57–58 (quoting Margaret A. Blanchard, The
American Urge To Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize
Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 821
(1992)).
116
See Calvert, supra note 113, at 64–65 (quoting Laurie P. Cohen, Internet’s
Ubiquity Multiplies Venues To Try Web Crimes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at B1)
(“In fact, former United States Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan, who prosecuted
[obscenity cases], has openly acknowledged that ‘the case could have been brought in
any district in which the product was sold,’ but [was brought in a district that] ‘may
be considered by some to be more conservative.’ ”).
111
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Courts, too, have acknowledged the problem of forum
shopping in obscenity cases.117 In one case, the court wrote that
obscenity prosecutions “present[] an unusual, perhaps unique
confluence of factors: substantial evidence of an extensive
government campaign . . . designed to use the burden of repeated
criminal prosecutions to chill the exercise of First Amendment
Under this scheme, defendants’ fate relies on
rights.”118
prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, even in the event of a
favorable outcome, litigation is costly. In the case quoted above,
where the judge admonished prosecutorial forum shopping, the
“winner” ultimately spent $3 million in legal fees battling the
government.119
In a more recent example, United States v. Extreme
Associates, Inc.,120 Californian pornographers were prosecuted for
obscenity in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.121 They were charged
with “mailing three video tapes to an undercover United States
postal inspector in Pittsburgh and delivering six digital video
clips over the Internet to that same . . . inspector.”122 This
inspector had ordered the tapes through Extreme Associates’
website and accessed the clips after purchasing a monthly
membership—the inspector was the one who availed himself of
the jurisdiction and material.123 According to Calvert, “Given
that southern California is the home of the adult movie industry
in the United States[,] . . . it is not surprising that blue-collarstereotyped Pittsburgh would be perceived as a more
conservative and, in turn, more favorable venue . . . .”124 In
Extreme Associates, the only reason that the defendants found
117
See, e.g., United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that “vindictive prosecution” is a legitimate grounds to overturn an
obscenity conviction.).
118
Id. at 855.
119
Calvert, supra note 113, at 60–61; see also McGee, supra note 106 (noting
that prosecutors use the tactic of forum shopping in hopes that “distributors would
simply give up and agree to whatever terms of future conduct the prosecutors
dictated, when faced with the expense and logistics of defending against a number of
federal charges in different places, all at the same time”).
120
431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
121
Id. at 151–52. See Calvert, supra note 113, at 64.
122
United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., No. 03-0203, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2860, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2009).
123
Id. at *2.
124
Calvert, supra note 113, at 64–65; see also Joe Mozingo, Obscenity Task
Force’s Aim Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at B1 (“Prosecutors . . . frequently
have picked Christian conservative areas to file.”).
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themselves in Pittsburgh for trial was because the prosecutors
effected a sting-type operation, and brought them there because
of the conservative jury. Defendants had done nothing to solicit
their materials to the good people of Pittsburgh, nor could they
have had any expectation that they would be hailed to court
there.
In the Little case, Paul Little, again, a Californian
pornography producer,125 was tried in Tampa, Florida.126 Like
Extreme, the prosecutors accessed the “obscene” material
themselves and ordered it to a mailbox in their preferred
venue.127
One commentator observed that “[t]he Bush
administration could have chosen any state in the Union, but
engineered an indictment in Tampa—an open case of forum
shopping for the most conservative jury pool it could find.”128
Practices such as these cannot be dismissed as simple
gamesmanship in the adversarial process; they are unfair
because the defendant has no viable method of protecting his
speech from being accessed in conservative communities.

125
If this seems like déjà vu, it is because it is a notable trend. The majority of
pornography originates in California, specifically the San Fernando Valley. This
area has been referred to as “Porn Valley.” See Brad A. Greenberg, Frisky Kitty
Battle Lands in Judge’s Lap, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 17, 2006, at N1 (observing that
the “San Fernando Valley [is] known to some as Porn Valley since it is home to most
of the nation’s pornography industry”); Sharon Mitchell, How To Put Condoms in the
Picture, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at Section 4, 11 (“[T]he San Fernando Valley—or
‘Porn Valley’—[is] where much of the sex-film industry is based . . . .”); see also Fritz,
supra note 10 (describing the effect that both the 2008 economic recession and the
growth of online websites have had on the California pornography industry).
126
See Calvert, supra note 113, at 65.
127
Compare Extreme Assocs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2860, at *1–2
(“[D]efendants have been charged with mailing three video tapes to an undercover
United States postal inspector in Pittsburgh and delivering six digital video clips
over the Internet to that same undercover postal inspector. The inspector ordered
the video tapes through Extreme Associates’ publicly available website and accessed
the video clips after purchasing a monthly membership to the members only section
of Extreme Associates’ website.”), with United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 161
(11th Cir. 2010) (“As part of the investigation, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service
office in Tampa ordered five DVD videos from the Appellants’ websites. The
inspector entered a post office box in Tampa as her shipping address and the DVDs
were subsequently shipped via U.S. mail.”).
128
James Madison Meets Max Hardcore: Florida Obscenity Case Could Force
Review of Community Standards in Internet Age, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (June 2,
2008), http://jonathanturley.org/2008/06/02/little-indiscretion-florida-obsenity-casecould-force-review-of-community-standards-in-internet-age/.
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Because the micro-local standard applies,129 the defendants
cannot anticipate the ultimate judge of their speech even though
it may be acceptable and legal in their home venue.
Forum shopping is encouraged under Miller because it loads
the deck. Prosecutors have an incentive to vigilantly bring
obscenity prosecutions because they can select forums that are
more likely to convict.
This mechanic incentivizes the
persistence of discretionary prosecution, but there is no real
“controversy.” In most cases, no citizens in the jurisdiction
complained; rather, they are used as a tool for prosecutors.
C.

Subjectivity/Vagueness

Another problem with Miller, one that has followed the test
since inception, is subjectivity: how to define and apply the test.
As one pornographer described, “This is the only crime you don’t
know you did until the jury tells you you did it.”130 Jurors are
instructed not to apply their own standards, but “the standards
of the ‘average person’ in their community.”131 The Court has
noted that “a principal concern . . . is to assure that the material
is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion,
nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person
or group.”132 Of course, this is easier said than done. As ACLU
President Nadine Strossen queried: “Can you honestly imagine
doing anything other than invoking your own tastes and
preferences?”133 Juries, it is said, “apply their interpretations of
local standards case-by-case in highly fact-specific rulings.”134
Miller doctrine is therefore inherently subjective; it is very
unlikely that a typical juror will do anything other than rely on
his own personal tastes and opinions.

129

See infra Part II.C.
Mozingo, supra note 124.
131
Cenite, supra note 53, at 35.
132
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974).
133
Cenite, supra note 53, at 36 (quoting NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 53 (1995)).
134
Cenite, supra note 53, at 51.
130
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Vagueness is a recognized problem in law to the point that
courts may void laws for vagueness.135 In the Miller dissent,
Justice Douglas wrote that “no more vivid illustration of vague
and uncertain laws could be designed than those we have
fashioned.”136 Echoing many of the concerns of those in the
pornography industry, Douglas maintained that due process
would only be served if one were prosecuted for material that had
already been deemed obscene.137 The problems of vagueness are
compounded and enhanced by the Internet. Problems arise in
the context of “the vast number of communities whose standards
may be applied and the rapidity with which new content is
published, resulting in a staggering burden on content
providers.”138
The problem of vagueness is closely linked to the local
community standard. Dawn Nunziato, a George Wasington
University Professor, writes, “Miller affirmatively establishes
that local communities enjoy the prerogative to determine what
sexually-themed expression is to be deemed obscene within their
communities.”139 A large part of this comes from the historical
place of pornography and its tension with the law, a deeper
foundational basis for Miller itself:
[T]he theory behind Miller is that since local communities are
the ones that have to deal with the allegedly deleterious effects
of the public display and sale of sexually explicit materials . . . it
should be the local communities . . . that decide whether a
particular movie, book or magazine is in fact obscene.140

But this reasoning does not make sense in the context of the
Internet. Most material must be affirmatively accessed, and in
no means is on “public display.” Indeed, there are indications
that the policy behind the obscenity exception may be outdated.

135
See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that “a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application violates the first essential of due process of law”).
136
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 42.
138
Cenite, supra note 53, at 51–52.
139
Dawn C. Nunziato, Technology and Pornography, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1535,
1540.
140
Calvert, supra note 113, at 61–62 (quoting FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE
PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE xx, (2001)).
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Currently, there is no obligation for either side to enter
evidence of a relevant community standard.141 It is presumed
that juries will know the prevailing standard and that the
material “speak[s] for itself.”142 In Miller, a police officer who had
conducted a statewide survey testified as to community
standards.143 Indeed, many have argued for the use of surveys as
objective evidence of community standards.144
D. Chilling Speech
A defendant’s inability to ascertain what is actually
“obscene” in a given community, the vagueness of obscenity
doctrine, and the very real threat of criminal prosecution lead
directly to a chilling of free speech.145 Moreover, because
obscenity only exists after it has been deemed so, a pornographer
wishing to distribute materials must take his chances at
prosecution. Prior to Miller, Justice Brennan argued against a
local approach because of its chilling effect, asserting that “[i]t
would be a hardy person who would sell a book or exhibit a film
anywhere in the land after this Court ha[s] sustained the
judgment of one ‘community.’ ”146 Justice Harlan wrote that local
standards may have “the intolerable consequence of denying

141
Scot A. Duvall, A Call for Obscenity Law Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
75, 92–95 (discussing the need to introduce objective evidence in obscenity trials);
Creasy, supra note 96, at 1044 (observing that in obscenity prosecutions, “the State
is not obligated to provide proof of the community standards” and that “[j]uries are
presumed to already know the prevailing community standards”); Rebecca Dawn
Kaplan, Note, Cyber-Smut: Regulating Obscenity on the Internet, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 189, 192–93 (1998) (arguing for the need for surveys in obscenity trials, and
describing how one could be implemented). But see Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054
(“[T]he State should be required to present evidence to prove the community
standards.”).
142
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973) (quoting United
States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (1969)).
143
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973).
144
See, e.g., Creasy, supra note 96, at 1047–48 (observing that “proponents of
prosecutorial use of survey evidence have advised that a carefully crafted and
conducted survey could be used for years across multiple trials, offering some
protection in cases where courts require the State to provide evidence of the
standard”); Kaplan, supra note 141.
145
See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1052 (noting that “[a]n inability to define the
community is unacceptable because it prevents the defendant from effectively
exercising the right to present evidence to prove the community standard”).
146
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
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some sections of the country access to material, there deemed
acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to
prevailing community standards of decency.”147
An identifiable problem with Miller is what Professor Mark
Cenite calls a “lack of specificity about the geographic
community’s scope . . . because content providers cannot tell in
advance who is included in a community with which they wish to
communicate.”148 Cenite compares the issue to the one before the
Court in Hamling, involving mail. The Court in Hamling held
prosecutions could be permitted in any district the obscene
material passed through.149 Justice Brennan, in dissent, wrote:
Under today’s “local” standards construction, . . . the guilt or
innocence of distributors of identical materials mailed from the
same locale can now turn on the chancy course of transit or
place of delivery of the materials. National distributors choosing
to send their products in interstate travels will be forced to cope
with the community standards of every hamlet into which their
goods may wander.150

This principle “create[s] even heavier burdens on the
Internet, a ‘packet’ network where parts of the same message
may take different, unpredictable routes through computers all
over the world before being reassembled at their destinations.”151
The net effect of imposing the standards of the most restrictive
community on all communities is that it deprives the medium of
diversity of expression and deprives adults of the right to access
materials that would not violate their own personal standards, or
the standards of their communities.152
It has even been argued that we are currently operating
under a de facto national standard, the national standard of the
most restrictive community.153
The most conservative
147

Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962).
Cenite, supra note 53, at 35.
149
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 143–144 (1974) (holding that
jurisdiction could be obtained wherever mail was received); see also United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that obscenity may be prosecuted
in any jurisdiction through which the allegedly obscene material passes).
150
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151
Cenite, supra note 53, at 39.
152
Id. at 56.
153
Swenson, supra note 108, at 878 (“A local community standard leads to the
lowest-common-denominator approach, whereby distributors market only material
that conforms to the standards of the most sensitive community. This standard
creates a de facto national standard that chills freedom of speech.”).
148
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communities in the country are thereby forcing their values on
the users of the Internet.154 Cenite observes, “A national average
standard has the virtue of preventing the least tolerant
community from controlling the entire medium, and giving the
least tolerant community the same influence on the national
average as the most tolerant community.”155 These concerns
were recently raised in the news when residents of
Massachusetts filed an injunction to prevent a new expansive
obscenity law from being passed, citing fear that it would chill
free speech.156
III. PROBLEMS WITH A NATIONAL STANDARD
Because of all the problems associated with Miller, the Ninth
Circuit’s approach in Kilbride is refreshing.
The national
standard, unfortunately, does not solve everything. Many have
argued that given the size and diversity of the United States, a
national standard is unascertainable.157 Improperly applied, a
national standard could be just as unworkable as the Miller test.
Alternatively, a national standard may bring “new definitional
and constitutional questions.”158 Any uniform, or national,
standard would have to operate through objective guidelines to
alleviate definitional problems and avoid repeating the
vagueness of Miller.159

154
Id. at 878–79 (observing that the current, or lowest-common-denominator
approach, “allows non-Internet users in the most conservative jurisdiction of the
country to force their values not only upon the rest of the country, but also upon the
world-wide community of Internet users.”).
155
Cenite, supra note 53, at 70.
156
Denise Lavoie, Groups Challenge Obscenity Law Scope, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 20,
2010, at Metro 2.
157
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (“People in different States vary in
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity.”); Boyce, supra note 106, at 345 (noting that a national
community of values toward obscenity “scarcely exists”).
158
Cenite, supra note 53, at 26, 57.
159
See Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and
the Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 716
(1996) (positing that the replacement of “national” for “local” in a Miller analysis
would not reduce the problems of Miller, including the chilling effect on speech,
because “those speaking on national or international computer networks will still be
unable to predict how every jury in every community will view the ‘national’ decency
standard”).
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States’ rights and concerns of federalism present problems.
The Miller test and traditional approaches are “rationales with
deep roots in the principles of federalism.”160 These concerns
have been present since Miller came down. Federalism concerns
also
were
present
in
Miller,
where
“[t]he
Court
warned . . . against resolving conflicts between states by
arbitrarily depriving the States of . . . power.”161 A national
standard has also been described as, “strangling diversity of
tastes and attitudes . . . . The median obscenity standard it would
call for juries to create would wind up restricting speech deemed
acceptable by many communities, while forcing other
communities to accept speech that they deem highly
objectionable.”162 The net result could be a homogenization of
diverse national culture and attitude. Perhaps more tellingly,
citizens of conservative communities would be offended at the
thought of a national cultural mandate forcing them to accept the
cultural norms of more liberal communities like New York and
Las Vegas.163 These concerns are all the more present in modern
times, where political matters are contentiously schismatic, and
strong support exists in popular opinion for States’ rights.
Any kind of solution must be concrete and objective. Most
objections to a national standard are aimed at the potential
ambiguity of such a standard.164 Moreover, it is possible that the
delineation of a “national” standard would be in effect the same
as a local standard, because a juror cannot apply the standard of
an unknown realm.165 Even if a “national” standard were
mandated, a juror would likely still apply his own beliefs.

160

Cenite, supra note 53, at 32.
Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
Calvert, supra note 113, at 84 (quoting David Johnson, U.S. v. Kilbride: 9th
Circuit’s Holding that Internet Obscenity Laws Should be Governed by a National
Standard Rests on Shaky Grounds, DIGITAL MEDIA LAWYER BLOG (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/11/us_v_kilbride_9th_circuits_hol.html
(website no longer available)).
163
Apparently a modern equivalent of Sodom and Gomorrah. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
164
See, e.g., Developments in the Law—The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1574, 1598 (1999) (warning of the “broadest definition of obscenity, potentially
resulting in an alarming retreat to a national obscenity standard”); see also Cenite,
supra note 53, at 70 (“If obscenity regulation is to continue in new media, the
standard involved must be defined.”).
165
Calvert, supra note 113, at 77 (“[H]ow can a hypothetical juror from
Louisville, Kentucky who has spent her entire life there, be expected to take into
161
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Extrinsic evidence has been proffered as a solution,
introducing objective forms of evidence to show the popularity of
pornography, correlating this to acceptability.
Many
commentators have debated the issue, arguing that defendants
should introduce evidence to establish standards, or force the
prosecution to introduce objective evidence.166 Internet searches
have been analyzed as a possible form of objective evidence. In
one case, a Florida man indicted on federal obscenity charges
offered to use Google search engine data of his community to
show that his material was not obscene.167 The case settled out of
court, but prompted at least one commentator to propose using
Google data as relevant evidence.168 This poses problems though
because “if the national community standard for the Internet is
to be judged by what is accepted on the Internet, then . . . a great
deal of sexual content is widely accepted . . . .”169 The results of
such a method would be dubious at best, evidenced by the simple
example that if search “hits” alone are a measure of acceptability,
then “orgy” trumps “apple pie” by a country mile.170
IV. PROPOSED ANSWER
The national standard delineated by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals is a good start. It effectively addresses the concerns of
chilling of speech and forum shopping. Unfortunately though, it
may be just as vague, if not more confusing, than the Miller test.
Any forward-looking approach must take into account concerns of
federalism, and limit subjectivity in definition and application.
This section proposes a method whereby this is achieved. Part
IV.A analyzes the problem of Miller at the most fundamental
level—the text of the case itself—and argues that the language of
the decision is flawed. Part IV.B introduces the “evolving
account the sexual values and mores of places like Austin, Texas; San Francisco,
California; or anywhere else, for that matter?”).
166
See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054; Kaplan, supra note 141 (arguing for the
need for surveys in obscenity trials, and describing how one could be implemented).
167
See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1033–34; Monica Hesse, The Google Ogle
Defense: A Search For America’s Psyche, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at C1; Richtel,
supra note 99.
168
See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054 (arguing that “the courts should allow
either party to use new search engine tracking technology to illuminate the
standards of the community.”).
169
Calvert, supra note 113, at 78.
170
See Richtel, supra note 99 (describing the relationship between search results
for “apple pie” and “orgy”).
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standards of decency” test and demonstrates that this test is
actually a close relative of the Miller test. Part IV.C proposes
methods for determining what he “evolving standards of decency”
would be, mostly relying on the use of survey evidence. Part
IV.D introduces an international comparative framework, first
showing that the Supreme Court often relies on international law
in determining “evolving standards of decency,” and then
weighing the arguments against such an approach. Part IV.E in
turn rejects the arguments against an international analysis,
providing reliable objective guidelines for determining how to
apply international law to national jurisprudence.
A.

Community Standards is Flawed Language and Should Be
Replaced with Evolving Standards of Decency

The text of Miller presents problems. Critics, jurists, and
jurors alike have struggled with the meaning of “whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest.”171 Ignoring the issue of defining “prurient interest,” the
“contemporary community standards” language is vague on its
face. Superimposing a “national community standards” test does
little to alleviate this problem. For this reason, the Eighth
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test suits the
purpose better: it already presupposes a national inquiry, and it
demands objective inquiry. It may be worth noting, too, that it
has already been used in analyzing sexual privacy.172 Perhaps
most importantly, it allows for international comparative
analysis, something which is fundamentally suited for the
Internet, because the Internet is a global medium.
The use of “evolving standards of decency” is not a major
departure from current jurisprudence and the Miller test. In an
essay on the conventional morality theory of judicial review,
Wojciech Sadurski looks to the various judicial tests used to
quantify a “moral majority.” Morality is considered and defined
according to Sadurski by, “contemporary community standards,

171

See supra Part II.
See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57
UCLA L. REV. 365, 372–73 (2009) (noting the similarity between the “evolving
standards of decency” test and its methodology, and the court’s analysis in Lawrence
v. Texas).
172
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community values, public morality . . . [and] evolving standards
of decency.”173 Sadurski notes that these standards are applied to
obscenity.174 In essence, these tests all serve the same purpose.
The tests both seek to ascertain the same goal: a majority
view on a moral issue. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been
known to use similar phrases interchangeably.175 The purpose is
Under the
the same, to “gaug[e] public temperament.”176
“evolving standards” doctrine, courts look to see whether a
national consensus has developed against a punishment, using a
majoritarian approach.177 Roger Alford notes that “the very
notion that ‘community standards’ should have constitutional
import is a concession to majoritarianism.”178
The “evolving standards of decency” language is not a
panacea of course, and begs the question: whose evolving
standards of decency? Indeed, the test has some aspects of
ambiguity.179
Part of the vagueness in these doctrines is
necessary for allowing flexibility.180 “Evolving standards” is
useful because it calls for objective guidance. Specifically, the
methodology of the Court in Atkins v. Virginia181 serves as a
helpful guidepost. In Atkins, the Court used “evolving standards
of decency” to determine whether to forbid the executions of
mentally retarded criminals.182 The Court used the test to
analyze legislation as an objective indication of these “evolving
standards,” searching for a national consensus.183 Because a

173
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, MORAL PLURALISM AND LEGAL NEUTRALITY 38 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
174
Id. at 39.
175
Id. at 38–39; Paige Connor Worsham, Note, So Easily Offended? A First
Amendment Analysis of the FCC’s Evolving Regulation of Broadcast Indecency and
Standards For Our Contemporary Community, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 378, 404
(2008).
176
See Worsham, supra note 175.
177
Lain, supra note 172, at 366 (“[P]rohibiting a punishment only after a
majority of states have already done so on their own.”).
178
Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REV. 639, 685 (2005); Boyce, supra note 106, at 338 (implying that a reason
for obscenity law in general is majoritarianism, contrasted with a Canadian
rejection of this idea).
179
See Worsham, supra note 175.
180
Id.
181
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
182
Worsham, supra note 175.
183
Id.
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national consensus is needed in obscenity law to combat the
problems of Miller and the Internet, the application of “evolving
standards of decency” is apt.
B.

Determining the “Evolving Standards”

The use of evolving standards is admittedly a majoritarian
doctrine. The fears of federalism advocates may be allayed in
considering the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, which
reveals that “the Court routinely—and explicitly—determines
constitutional protection based on whether a majority of states
agree with it.”184 Some have argued that First Amendment
jurisprudence is no different, and is “chock full of line drawing
and limitations, with examples of explicitly majoritarian
decisionmaking [sic] at nearly every turn.”185 Moreover, it has
been said that the “contemporary community” standards test is
nothing if not a “nose-counting” of the majority.186 At a threshold
level, the decision to exclude categories of speech from First
Amendment protection turned upon majoritarian analysis.187
From there, the exclusion of child pornography followed a similar
methodology, taking into account state statutes.188
Assuming that a majoritarian consensus is relevant in
ascertaining “community standards,” or “evolving standards of
decency,” the use of surveys can provide highly probative
evidence of a national consensus.189 A particularly useful piece
would be the recently released survey, The National Survey of
Sexual Health and Behavior (“NSSHB”). The NSSHB, a recently
released survey by researchers at Indiana University, is the
largest survey of sexual behaviors and attitudes in 20 years.190 It
184

Lain, supra note 172, at 365, 369 (opining that “[o]ver the past few years, the
country’s top constitutional scholars have filled volumes of law reviews convincing
us that the Supreme Court is an inherently majoritarian institution, and it is”
(footenotes omitted)).
185
Id. at 392.
186
See Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem,
119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 158–59 (2005).
187
Lain, supra note 172, at 393.
188
Id. at 394.
189
See Calvert, supra note 113, at 61–62; Creasy, supra note 96, at 1052; supra
note 141.
190
See Carolyn Butler, After 20 Years, the Sexual Landscape has Shifted, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2010, at E2; Ctr. Sexual Health Promotion, NATIONAL SURVEY OF
SEXUAL HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR, http://www.nationalsexstudy.indiana.edu/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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surveys a large sample size and quantifies types of sexual
activity and attitudes.191 The NSSHB could be an excellent
resource for starting an analysis of whether something is
nationally acceptable.
Although some surveys have been
criticized due to their small sample size, the NSSHB is immune
to such attacks because of its breadth and comprehensiveness,
and is therefore a sound guide.192
Many of the common targets of obscenity convictions are
demonstrably acceptable by the NSSHB. In Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton,193 the Supreme Court acknowledged that some thirtyone obscenity cases were determined by the Justices applying
their own separate criteria of obscenity.194 These criteria were
anything but scientific; for example, Justice White deemed
anything showing erections, intercourse, oral or anal sex,
obscene.195
Florida, a state often sought for obscenity
prosecutions, has an obscenity statute decreeing anal and oral
sex as “deviate sexual intercourse.”196 The NSSHB lifts the veil
of Americans’ private lives, however, showing that 88% of men
aged 30–39 engaged in fellatio and that nearly half of 25–29 year
olds have engaged in anal sex at least once.197 With such large
numbers, it is hard to make an argument that these activities are
unacceptable by nature.
C.

International Comparative Analysis Framework

The Internet, though, is not strictly confined to our national
borders. For this reason, an international comparative analysis
would be helpful and illustrative. Obscenity law is inseparable
from international law, as the doctrine grew out of international
analysis.198 Informed not only by the history of American
obscenity law, an international approach is valuable for shedding
191

See Butler, supra note 190.
See, e.g., Creasy, supra note 96, at 1049 (describing various instances where
courts have rejected survey data).
193
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
194
Id. at 82 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 232 (1979).
196
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001(5) (West 2008). This definition is still subject to
the “contemporary community standards” test, but seems extremely suggestive. See
Haggerty v. State, 531 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
197
See Jon Henley, America Reveals its Sexual Secrets, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5,
2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/oct/05/sex-us-americanattitudes-survey?INTCMP=SRCH.
198
See infra Part IV.D.
192
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light on obscenity doctrine because American jurisprudence is so
fractured.199 Moreover, international analysis has been used
under “evolving standards” more frequently as of late, and can be
narrowed objectively by guiding measures.
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that obscenity
doctrine was instituted from international comparative inquiry.
When the Court excluded obscenity from First Amendment
protection it cited “the universal judgment that obscenity should
be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50
nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the
20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.”200
This is an explicitly majoritarian exception: “[the Court] made a
categorical ruling based on the one the states had made on their
own.”201
Therefore, disregarding the recent resurgence of
international comparative analysis in constitutional law,
obscenity doctrine itself is innately an international inquiry.
Moreover, this applies with greater force to the Internet because
the Internet is an international medium.
International inquiry has been used increasingly in
constitutional analysis, particularly in determining “evolving
standards of decency.”202 In Atkins v. Virginia,203 Justice Stevens
cited the “world community” in support of what he determined
was an emerging “widespread consensus” against the death
penalty for the mentally infirm.204 This reasoning has expanded
beyond the realm of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, along
with the “evolving standards” test. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
Kennedy cited a decision of the European Court of Human Rights
to invalidate Texas sodomy laws.205 Far from anomalies, the
Court has a long tradition of using foreign law to inform
constitutional analysis.206 Foreign law has even “informed the
test of “reasonableness,” a standard eminently similar to the

199
See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1252 (9th Cir. 2009); Boyce,
supra note 106, at 345 (comparing American obscenity law with Canadian law, and
noting that American law is vague and uncertain in comparison).
200
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
201
Lain, supra note 172, at 394.
202
See O’Brien, supra note 26, at 105.
203
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
204
Id. at 316 n.21, 317.
205
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
206
See O’Brien, supra note 26, at 89.
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Miller issue.207 This correlation is seen in cases such as Coker v.
Georgia,208 Atkins v. Virginia,209 Lawrence v. Texas,210 and Roper
v. Simmons.211
The use of comparative analysis is polarizing.212 Justice
Ginsburg has endorsed the view, going so far as to warn, “[w]e
are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and
learn from others.”213 Not all share this view; the international
approach has been criticized by many, on and off the bench.214 A
major concern comes from subjective judicial interpretation; fears
arise that subjective application of foreign law can result in
countermajoritarian rule.215 Nonetheless, there are compelling
reasons for international analysis in the context of Internet
pornography, mostly tied to the problems of the local standard in
the digital age.216 Unlike the issue of whether a right embedded
in domestic law should apply to domestic conduct in light of a
similar foreign law, here the issue is more compelling. Like

207

See id. at 92–93.
433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for
rape where death did not ensue.”).
209
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (basing decision to ban executions of mentally
retarded criminals partly on consensus of “world community”).
210
539 U.S. 558, 576–78 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)) (relying on decisions of European jurisdictions for evidence of consensus).
211
543 U.S. 551, 577–78 (2005) (relying partly on international authorities in
holding a juvenile death penalty unconstitutional).
212
Justice Scalia provided a vehement dissent in Atkins. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at
347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble
Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal . . . to the views
of . . . the so called ‘world community[]’ ”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because . . .
foreign nations decriminalize conduct.”).
213
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 1
(2003).
214
See, e.g., supra note 212; infra note 215.
215
See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider
Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International
Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1308–09
(2004).
216
See Alford, supra note 178, at 687–88 (“Thus, in this most global of media,
not a single Justice expressed the view that foreign standards were somehow
relevant to regulate sex on the Internet. As a constitutional matter, the
contemporary community is anything but a global village.”).
208
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admiralty or immigration law, it involves whether domestic law
applied to inherently transnational conduct should borrow from
foreign law.
The fear of subjective application of international law can be
assuaged. As with the definition of “obscenity,” an objective or
methodological approach informs analysis. These fears are
allayed by “limit[ing] the members of the world community
whose opinions would ‘count.’ ”217 This has been countered by the
notion of the difficulty inherent in such a process: How can a
court determine which foreign countries to “count”?218
D. Objective Approach to Limiting Comparative Law Sources
A court can determine which foreign countries to count by
deference to studies and statistics, much like the use of surveys
in Part III and Part IV.C. There have been many studies
recently regarding cultural differences across nations,
quantifying and tabulated the differences for easy references.
These can inform an obscenity inquiry. For example, one could
look to studies relating to sexual values219 and general cultural
value studies.220 Notably, Professor Geert Hofstede’s Cultural
Dimensions could prove to be very useful in guiding analysis
because it is premised on the difference of cultural values. In
looking to foreign law to inform American cultural inquiry,
limiting foreign sources to those that are similar to America
culturally guards against the common criticisms of comparative
analysis.
In the Hofstede Study, first published in 1984, Hofstede
developed five indices of cultural values: small versus large
power distance; individualism versus collectivism; masculinity
versus femininity; weak versus strong uncertainty avoidance;

217

Larsen, supra note 215, at 1322.
Id. at 1324.
219
See David P. Schmitt et al., Why Can’t a Man Be More Like a Woman? Sex
Differences in Big Five Personality Traits Across 55 Cultures, 94 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 168, 168–72 (2008) (analyzing the sexual differences in a sample of
men and women across multiple countries through personality traits, cultural value
indices—including the Hofstede Study,—gender equality indices, and socioeconomic
indicators).
220
See generally HOFSTEDE, supra note 27; David P. Schmitt et al, The
Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits: Patterns and Profiles of
Human Self-Description Across 56 Nations, 38 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 173
(2007) (comparing personality traits across cultures).
218
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and long versus short term orientation.221 These values were
polled from various workers internationally.222 While these
values do not relate explicitly to the ascertainment of “obscene,”
they can be used to identify nations that have similar cultural
values to the United States. The Hofstede Study charts these
values on an index and assigns numerical values to countries.
Looking to the United States’ position in these various indices,
one can then look to the closest one or two countries on both
sides. By compiling a list of countries in this manner, an
objective guideline can inform comparative analysis.
This
approach generates a list of countries that are culturally similar
to the United through the use of a diverse field of different
cultural value sets. This method is limited, weeds out extreme
outliers, and is disciplined in focus. While the Hofstede Study
approach may not be perfect, it is nonetheless substantially more
guided and methodical than picking out of a hat or choosing
“English speaking” countries. At the very least, it is markedly
more methodical than any approach the Supreme Court has used
in creating binding law on the nation when looking to
international law.
The Hofstede Study values can be used to determine sexual
values even more narrowly than its general application. While
the Hofstede Study values were not developed to examine sexual
attitudes, it nevertheless could be used in considering a limiting
application of comparative analysis. Sexual attitudes are often
rooted in cultural norms.223 Moreover, many of the index values
are even closely enough related to sexuality to be delineated in
the text, as in the case of the “power distance” index224 and
masculinity-feminity.225 The values have been used elsewhere in
sexual psychology research226 and are more objective than “nose
counting.” By analogy, published studies have correlated sexual

221

See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at xix–xx.
See id. at 41–43.
223
Vipan K. Luthar & Harsh K. Luthar, Using Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions
to Explain Sexually Harassing Behaviors in an International Context, 13 INT’L J.
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 268, 269 (2002) (noting that researchers theorize that
sexual harassment is informed by cultural contexts).
224
See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at 99 (noting that high-power distance indexed
countries tend to be more lenient towards under-age sex).
225
See id. at 329–30.
226
Luthar & Luthar, supra note 223.
222
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harassment to the Hofstede Study values.227 Noticing that the
United States rates similarly to Canada, the Netherlands, and
Great Britain on the individuality index,228 one could then limit a
comparative analysis to those countries. This can be done across
all the indices to create a varied, yet precise, mode of analysis.
Similar comparative studies on obscenity law have been
conducted, such as comparing American obscenity law to
Canadian law and finding that they are strikingly different.229
For example, looking to Canadian law, one finds a similar
“community standards” test but learns that Canada employs a
“national” standard.230 Using the Hofstede Study to create a list
for comparison, judges can objectively determine whether
American obscenity law is just or out of line with identifiable
contemporary standards.
While this methodology may not be as precise as other
applications of the Hofstede Study, this is only because
Hofstede’s values do not include a pointed value like “prurient
interest identifier.” Barring a study tailor-made to the attitudes
of cultures of online pornography, the benefits of the Hofstede
Study are overwhelming. Professor Hofstede used large numbers
of people across a multitude of countries in his study, resulting in
one of the most influential cross-cultural studies ever
published.231 Moreover, the proposed application of the Hofstede
Study is not to identify sexual values, but to find analogous
countries on a macro-level. The Hofstede Study is a reliable and
practical method for amassing a list of countries with similar
cultural values to America.

227

See id.
See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at 315.
229
See Boyce, supra note 106, at 337–38.
230
Justin A. Giordano, The United States Constitution’s First Amendment vs.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Comparative Analysis of Obscenity
and Pornography as Forms of Expression, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 71, 79–80 (2004).
231
See Luthar & Luthar, supra note 223, at 272 (describing the value of the
Hofstede Study); John W. Bing, Hofstede’s Consequences: The Impact of His Work on
Consulting and Business Practices, ITAP INT’L, http://www.itapintl.com/
facultyandresources/articlelibrarymain/hofstedes-consequences-the-impact-of-hiswork-on-consulting-and-business-practices.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
228

WF_Adams (Do Not Delete)

246

12/3/2012 12:36 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:211

CONCLUSION
Pornography and obscenity has changed significantly since
the Supreme Court heard Miller v. California. At the time, the
Court delineated a workable solution to a problem that had
plagued courts for years. The emergence of the Internet as a
global network, and its use as a primary method of delivering
pornography, however, has dulled the applicability of Miller’s
obscenity doctrine. The use of “local community” standards is
unreasonable and has resulted in unfair prosecutions and the
chilling of free speech. Recognizing this problem, the Ninth
Circuit took an admirable step toward progress in applying a
national standard to obscenity. This approach, however, does
little to reduce one of the largest problems with Miller:
subjectivity.
Moreover, the national standard carries a
definitional burden.
The “community standards” language
should be eschewed in favor of the more flexible and objective
“evolving standards of decency” test from the Eighth
Amendment. This test has proven workable in fields beyond the
Eighth Amendment, such as sexual privacy.
Under the “evolving standards” test, international law is
often consulted. To allay fears of subjective consultation, the
Hofstede Study can be used to systematically approach
international law. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said:
For the rational study of the law . . . the man of the future is the
man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.232

The Supreme Court, while seemingly reluctant to consult
international law for constitutional interpretation, has engaged
in the practice frequently. In the case of determining the
standard for Internet obscenity, there is greater reason than
perhaps ever to consult international law because the allegedly
obscene material exists internationally.
It comes from
international sources, goes to international sources, and travels
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across international networks. Echoing the words of Justice
Holmes, statistics and rational methods can be used to guide the
foray into international waters.
Miller is patently outdated now and has been for quite some
time. Attitudes have changed since Miller, and many practices
that were once taboos are no longer forbidden. Nonetheless,
pornographers must deal with the fear of being picked at any
time for prosecution, and then subjected to the most restrictive
standard in the nation. While courts have been historically
lethargic in adapting to technological and societal change, they
can also serve as a catalyst for change. The world of Miller is no
more, and it is time to sever, judicially and philosophically, from
at least the first part of the Cerberean antique that is its rule.

